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The	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest.	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠset	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagenda	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ(what	 ﾠwould	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcalled)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cognitive	 ﾠsciences.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠsaid,	 ﾠessentially,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ(or, more 
accurately, as cognition is capable of doing):	 ﾠExplain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠand	 ﾠyou’ve	 ﾠexplained	 ﾠcognition.	 ﾠTest	 ﾠyour	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠby	 ﾠdesigning	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
machine	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠa	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠcognizer	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠdo	 ﾠit	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
veridically	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠcognizers	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠtell	 ﾠits	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠreal	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠcognizer’s	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠyou	 ﾠreally	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠask	 ﾠfor	 ﾠanything	 ﾠmore.
A	 ﾠmachine?	 ﾠIsn’t	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalready	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontradiction	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms?	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠif	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbiassed	 ﾠ
preconceptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠmachines.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ“machine”	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠa	 ﾠdynamical	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ
governed	 ﾠby	 ﾠcausality.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠscore,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠare	 ﾠmachines	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠwho	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠbiology	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠtranscends	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠcausality,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ“mind	 ﾠover	 ﾠmatter”	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠan	 ﾠextra,	 ﾠspontaneous	 ﾠforce	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuniverse.	 ﾠ
(We	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠup	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠtill	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠessay.)
So	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠmachines,	 ﾠand	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠour	 ﾠmission	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ ind	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠmachine	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare,	 ﾠby	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmachine	 ﾠworks.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠhunch	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠwrong.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠcomputers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠcomputation.	 ﾠSo,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠthought,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtask	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠ ind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
right	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠpass	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Turing	 ﾠTest”	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
anything	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠindistiguishably	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
Searle’s	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠRoom.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcelebrated	 ﾠthought-ﾭ‐experiment	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
philosopher	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomputations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
successfully	 ﾠpasses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest	 ﾠ[T2]	 ﾠin	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠdemonstrates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠ
cannot	 ﾠ“be	 ﾠas	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠdoes”	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠsolely	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
communicate	 ﾠby	 ﾠemail	 ﾠin	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠindistinguishably	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠreal	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠcognizer	 ﾠ
(even	 ﾠif	 ﾠtested	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlifetime)	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠT2	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
generated	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠcomputation.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠis	 ﾠimplementation-ﾭ‐independent:	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
computation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreally	 ﾠdo	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsame	 ﾠthing	 ﾠno	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠhow	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
implement	 ﾠit	 ﾠphysically.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠT2-ﾭ‐passing	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠin	 ﾠChinese,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠ
program	 ﾠ–	 ﾠyet	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠChinese.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠno	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠrunning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
program	 ﾠunderstands	 ﾠeither.
How	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠknow	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠChinese?	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
thought-ﾭ‐experiment.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠone	 ﾠyet	 ﾠhas	 ﾠactually	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
pass	 ﾠT2	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlifetime.	 ﾠYet	 ﾠwe	 ﾠall	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠ
Chinese,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠand	 ﾠexecute	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmanipulates	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠmeanings	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstand,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanipulates	 ﾠthem	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠshapes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmeaning.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoes.	 ﾠ
And	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠrightly	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠor	 ﾠanything	 ﾠelse	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠprogram)	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmanipulating	 ﾠmeaningless	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠthose	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠmean,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlifetime	 ﾠ–	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠall	 ﾠappearances	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnative	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠ
pen-ﾭ‐pals.
How	 ﾠis	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhypothetical	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐existent	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠprogram?	 ﾠLet’s	 ﾠset	 ﾠaside	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠ
worries	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcould	 ﾠever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠT2-ﾭ‐passing	 ﾠ
computer	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠaa	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠshallower	 ﾠworries,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhether,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
were,	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠcould	 ﾠactually	 ﾠdo	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsymbol	 ﾠmanipulations	 ﾠhimself.	 ﾠA	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠis:	 ﾠHow	 ﾠwould	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠChinese?	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
program	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreally	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠat	 ﾠT2-ﾭ‐scale,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlifetime,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlifelong	 ﾠ
Chinese	 ﾠemail	 ﾠinterlocutor	 ﾠasked	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠChinese)	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠ
Chinese,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreply	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠChinese)	 ﾠwould	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike:	 ﾠ“What	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠabsurd	 ﾠquestion!	 ﾠHaven’t	 ﾠyou	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcommunicating	 ﾠin	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ
40	 ﾠyears?”
Yet,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠasked,	 ﾠin	 ﾠEnglish,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠChinese,	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreply	 ﾠ
(quite	 ﾠtruthfully)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcouldn’t	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠa	 ﾠword;	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠfaithfully	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrequisite	 ﾠsymbol	 ﾠmanipulations,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠmemorized,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ40	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠattention	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠreally	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠheart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠit	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠinto	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠTuring’s	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“cognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
cognition	 ﾠdoes”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠspeaking	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠwriting)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠare	 ﾠconcerned.	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠis	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠspeakers/
understanders	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠindistinguishably	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠall	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐
how.	 ﾠYet	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsays	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠChinese:	 ﾠWhat’s	 ﾠmissing?	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠhow	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
know	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠmissing?
What’s	 ﾠmissing	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠChinese.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠ
Searle	 ﾠknows,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
speak	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠChinese,	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfeeling,	 ﾠ
regardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠanything	 ﾠelse	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠor	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ(We	 ﾠwill	 ﾠelaborate	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠ
below.)
Is	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeath-ﾭ‐knell	 ﾠfor	 ﾠTuring’s	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“cognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠdoes”?	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠfar,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠspeaking/
understanding,	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠT2	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠis	 ﾠaccomplished	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
via	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠalone	 ﾠ(symbol	 ﾠmanipulation).The	 ﾠRobotic	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlanguage-ﾭ‐only	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest,	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠreally	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠintended	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠshould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠintended)?	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠessence	 ﾠof	 ﾠTuring’s	 ﾠ
“cognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠdoes”	 ﾠcriterion	 ﾠis	 ﾠTuring-ﾭ‐indistinguishability	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠcognizer	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠcognizer	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠdo	 ﾠa	 ﾠlot	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
produce	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠlanguage.	 ﾠA	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠcognizer	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠcountless	 ﾠother	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠworld	 ﾠof	 ﾠobjects,	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠevents,	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠtraits,	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠT2	 ﾠ
candidate	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdo	 ﾠall	 ﾠthose	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings	 ﾠtoo,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincapacity	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
immediately	 ﾠdetectable,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠwould	 ﾠfail	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtest.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠthings	 ﾠsuccessfully,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠT2	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠlot	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
computer:	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠsensorimotor	 ﾠrobot,	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠsensing	 ﾠand	 ﾠacting	 ﾠ
upon	 ﾠall	 ﾠthose	 ﾠobjects,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠagain	 ﾠTuring-ﾭ‐indistinguishably	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠreal	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠcognizers	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ
Now	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠforgiven	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠsymbol	 ﾠinput/output	 ﾠcapability	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhis	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠthree	 ﾠreasons:	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
powerful	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeneral;	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsimulate	 ﾠand	 ﾠapproximate	 ﾠjust	 ﾠabout	 ﾠany	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
physical	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠLanguage,	 ﾠtoo,	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeneral;	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
words	 ﾠjust	 ﾠabout	 ﾠany	 ﾠobject,	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrait.	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠRestricting	 ﾠT2	 ﾠto	 ﾠemail	 ﾠ
interactions	 ﾠrules	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠof	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠappearance,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbias	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠjudgment:	 ﾠTuring’s	 ﾠcriterion	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“cognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠdoes”:	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠindistinguishable	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠour	 ﾠown.	 ﾠNot:	 ﾠ“it	 ﾠmust	 ﾠlook	 ﾠjust	 ﾠlike	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠus.”
But	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠdo	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtested	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ“email”	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest,	 ﾠT2	 ﾠ.	 ﾠPeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
name,	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠand	 ﾠreason	 ﾠabout	 ﾠobjects,	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠevents,	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠtraits	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
world;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrecognize,	 ﾠidentify,	 ﾠmanipulate	 ﾠand	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
them	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠrobot,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠan	 ﾠemail	 ﾠpen-ﾭ‐pal.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
fact,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsensorimotor	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrobot,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclear	 ﾠhow	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
email	 ﾠT2	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpassed	 ﾠsuccessfully:	 ﾠWould	 ﾠit	 ﾠnot	 ﾠarouse	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠsuspicion	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠpen-ﾭ‐pal	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalways	 ﾠmute	 ﾠabout	 ﾠphotos	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsent	 ﾠvia	 ﾠsnail-ﾭ‐mail?	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠis	 ﾠthere	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠcredible	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠanything	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠever	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ
seen,	 ﾠtouched,	 ﾠheard	 ﾠor	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠanything?
So	 ﾠchances	 ﾠare	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemail	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest,	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠupon,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrobotic	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest	 ﾠtoo:	 ﾠLet’s	 ﾠcall	 ﾠrobotic	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest	 ﾠT3.	 ﾠT2	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠlanguage-ﾭ‐in/language-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠon	 ﾠand	 ﾠtests	 ﾠT3	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ
indirectly.	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠnever	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠcould	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
computer,	 ﾠcomputing.	 ﾠComputing	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanipulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeaningless	 ﾠsymbols,	 ﾠ
based	 ﾠon	 ﾠrules	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshapes	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsymbols.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠshapes	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠare	 ﾠinterpretable	 ﾠ(by	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmean)	 ﾠas	 ﾠreferring	 ﾠto.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠ
English,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstring	 ﾠof	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠapple	 ﾠis	 ﾠred”	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠresemble	 ﾠapples,	 ﾠred,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
apples	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠred.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠSearle,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠroom,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsentence,	 ﾠin	 ﾠChinese,	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmean	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠapple	 ﾠis	 ﾠred.”	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠinsisted,	 ﾠmemorably)	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeaningless	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“squiggles”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“squoggles.”
Symbol	 ﾠGrounding.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠto	 ﾠSearle?	 ﾠWe	 ﾠknow	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠpass	 ﾠT2	 ﾠin	 ﾠEnglish;	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠpass	 ﾠT3	 ﾠin	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠtoo.	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠwe’ve	 ﾠ
mentioned,	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpass	 ﾠT2	 ﾠin	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠT3	 ﾠin	 ﾠChinese;	 ﾠand	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠidea	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠmean.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠT2	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠsymbol	 ﾠmanipulation	 ﾠalone	 ﾠwas	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠa	 ﾠ iction	 ﾠall	 ﾠalong:	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
done.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstill	 ﾠhaven’t	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠto	 ﾠSearle.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠ
symbols	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠobjects,	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠevents,	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠtraits	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld;	 ﾠand	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠrecognize,	 ﾠidentify,	 ﾠmanipulate	 ﾠand	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠobjects,	 ﾠetc.,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠname,	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠand	 ﾠreason	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠEnglish.	 ﾠLet’s	 ﾠ
call	 ﾠthat	 ﾠknow-ﾭhow:	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor,	 ﾠrather,	 ﾠSearle’s	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠ
T2	 ﾠand	 ﾠT3	 ﾠin	 ﾠEnglish.	 ﾠSensorimotor	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdynamic,	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠ
(i.e.,	 ﾠanalog),	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠjust	 ﾠcomputational	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠdigital,	 ﾠsymbolic).	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠhence	 ﾠ
cognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠcomputation.	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠus	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠhis	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠsymbols,	 ﾠSearle’s	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠare	 ﾠ“grounded”	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠhis	 ﾠsensorimotor	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthings	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
symbols	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠconnect	 ﾠhis	 ﾠwords	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠreferents.	 ﾠIs	 ﾠsensorimotor	 ﾠ
grounding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠas	 ﾠmeaning,	 ﾠthen?	 ﾠCan	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠT3-ﾭ‐passing	 ﾠrobot	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠreally	 ﾠmean	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠsaid?
The	 ﾠCogito.	 ﾠWell	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠbit	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠto	 ﾠask.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalready	 ﾠknow	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
Descartes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠprovable	 ﾠtruths	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
mathematics	 ﾠbut	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ(with	 ﾠone	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠexception	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠget	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
minute),	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠno	 ﾠcertainty.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠeven	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠof	 ﾠphysics:	 ﾠ
They	 ﾠare	 ﾠjust	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
outside	 ﾠworld;	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠjust	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠprobable.	 ﾠSame	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠpeople,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠother	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠthink:	 ﾠHighly	 ﾠprobable,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcertain.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
matter?	 ﾠMaybe	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformal	 ﾠworld	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
mathematics.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠthings	 ﾠare	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠworld	 ﾠof	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠand	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
too,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthem;	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsure.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠDescartes	 ﾠalso	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠanother	 ﾠcertainty,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
very	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠpole	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcertainties	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠworld	 ﾠof	 ﾠmathematics:	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠ(Descartes’	 ﾠcelebrated	 ﾠ“Cogito”).	 ﾠIt’s	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
doubt	 ﾠyou’re	 ﾠthinking,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠdoubting	 ﾠis	 ﾠthinking.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠsounds	 ﾠlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrick,	 ﾠso	 ﾠlet’s	 ﾠ
put	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠway:	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠ
feeling	 ﾠsomething.	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠfeeling.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠtoothache,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
doubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠreally	 ﾠmy	 ﾠtooth	 ﾠthat’s	 ﾠailing.	 ﾠMaybe	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠpain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠeye	 ﾠ
infection.	 ﾠMaybe	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠtooth	 ﾠat	 ﾠall;	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠextracted.	 ﾠWorse,	 ﾠmaybe	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠreally	 ﾠ
true	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠno	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbody	 ﾠand	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠelse	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
illusion,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdream!	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠ
feeling	 ﾠsomething:	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠaching	 ﾠtooth,	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠhappens,	 ﾠa	 ﾠtoothache),	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠtoothache.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthat’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertainty.	 ﾠFeeling	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcertainty	 ﾠ(when	 ﾠyou’re	 ﾠfeeling).	 ﾠWhenever	 ﾠyou’re	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠ	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠfelt,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠa	 ﾠdoubt.	 ﾠWhatever	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike,	 ﾠthat’s	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠfelt,	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠa	 ﾠdoubt.	 ﾠThings	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ(an	 ﾠinjured	 ﾠtooth),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
certainly	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠlike	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠthey	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠtoothache),	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠthey’re	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠfelt.
Meaning.	 ﾠNow	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion:	 ﾠIs	 ﾠgrounding,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠthing	 ﾠas	 ﾠmeaning?	 ﾠCan	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠT3-ﾭ‐passing	 ﾠrobot	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreally	 ﾠmean	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
said	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreally	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠanything	 ﾠat	 ﾠall)?
At	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnow	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrobot	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠmean	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠreason	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠsure	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠrobot	 ﾠthere,	 ﾠor	 ﾠan	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠlet’s	 ﾠset	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaside	 ﾠas	 ﾠidle	 ﾠ
sceptical	 ﾠfretting.	 ﾠ
Is	 ﾠit	 ﾠany	 ﾠworse,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrobot’s	 ﾠmeaning,	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠworld	 ﾠexisting,	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠof	 ﾠphysics?	 ﾠIs	 ﾠit	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠsettling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠinsisting	 ﾠon	 ﾠcertainty?
Turing	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthat:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTT	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠno	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠor	 ﾠworse	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠwith	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother:	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
sure	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠelse	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmean	 ﾠanything	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexist).	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure	 ﾠabout	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthere,	 ﾠall	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
really	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure	 ﾠof	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠsay	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠmeaningful,	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
mean.	 ﾠI	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjabbering	 ﾠnonsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaying.
Back	 ﾠto	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠroom.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠsays	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoesn’t	 ﾠhave	 ﾠany	 ﾠidea	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
saying	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmanipulates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠsymbols.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠ
anything)	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠmanipulating	 ﾠmean.	 ﾠCan	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtake	 ﾠhim	 ﾠat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
word?	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠspeaker	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
40	 ﾠyears	 ﾠin	 ﾠChinese,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠand	 ﾠacts	 ﾠlike	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠand	 ﾠknows	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmeans.
But	 ﾠwe’ve	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbene it	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdoubt,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠreasons:	 ﾠ
Maybe	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠtalks	 ﾠnonsense	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠhe’s	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ
meaningful.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠall	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthat.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠall	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsometimes.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠreverse:	 ﾠCan	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠhe’s	 ﾠtalking	 ﾠ
nonsense?	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ40	 ﾠyears	 ﾠstraight,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐stop?	 ﾠSurely	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠreally	 ﾠmean	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠhere	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠis	 ﾠamiss	 ﾠif	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhappens.	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠin	 ﾠtongues	 ﾠ–	 ﾠtongues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠhonestly,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoesn’t	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsays	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠtongues	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠ
sense,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconclude,	 ﾠquite	 ﾠnaturally,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuffering	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
multiple	 ﾠpersonality	 ﾠdisorder:	 ﾠBut	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠpersonality	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpathology,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
personalities	 ﾠusually	 ﾠonly	 ﾠemerge	 ﾠone	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSearle,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
explanation:	 ﾠ“I’m	 ﾠjust	 ﾠmanipulating	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠrules;	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠidea	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠmeans.”	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠmoreover,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠis	 ﾠall	 ﾠtrue.
So	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠescape	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠsure	 ﾠarbiter	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhe	 ﾠunderstands	 ﾠor	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠanything,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠtransmitting	 ﾠand	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠ
Chinese.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠcertainty,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
meaning	 ﾠanything	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.
For	 ﾠover	 ﾠthree	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠnow,	 ﾠSearle’s	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠroom	 ﾠargument	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdebated	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
connection	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠcomputation.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
here	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠharder	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
just	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠare	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠtalking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠalone	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
pass	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠwhether,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠsaid.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠT3	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
computer,	 ﾠcomputing,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠrobot,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdynamical	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcomputation,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsensorimotor	 ﾠtransduction,	 ﾠand	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠa	 ﾠlot	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠessential	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
dynamic	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠin	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.
Unlike	 ﾠSearle,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠtells	 ﾠus,	 ﾠhonestly,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠidea	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsquiggles	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
receiving	 ﾠand	 ﾠsending	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠT3-ﾭ‐passing	 ﾠrobot	 ﾠshows	 ﾠus	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠknow,	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠpointing	 ﾠout	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠreferents,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinteracting	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠworld	 ﾠof	 ﾠobjects,	 ﾠetc.,	 ﾠ
indistinguishably	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠus.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠwords	 ﾠsquare	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdeeds,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
ours	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠis	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠright	 ﾠthat	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠfor	 ﾠanything	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠT3	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
impossible,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠunreasonable,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠmore	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
mind-ﾭ‐reading	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother	 ﾠeither?
The	 ﾠBrain.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠis	 ﾠthere	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠmore?	 ﾠMight	 ﾠthere	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠmore	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠtesting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠT3?	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠmight	 ﾠthere	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠmore	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
test	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthan	 ﾠT3?	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠis	 ﾠyes.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠtesting	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how	 ﾠwith	 ﾠT3,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
testing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠtesting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠ(1).	 ﾠWe	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠthat	 ﾠT2	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠ
meaningless	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠin,	 ﾠmeaningless	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠout,	 ﾠsymbol-ﾭ‐manipulation	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
between)	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeven	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠtest	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
grounded	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠreferents.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmediation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠinterpreter,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠour	 ﾠrobot	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
making	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠreferents,	 ﾠautonomously.	 ﾠT3	 ﾠ ixed	 ﾠthat.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
grounded	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrobot’s	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsensorimotor	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
referents	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠsymbols,	 ﾠat	 ﾠfull	 ﾠT3	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlifetime.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠrobotic	 ﾠ
indistinguishability	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠus	 ﾠmean	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠindistinguishability?
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠburning	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠall	 ﾠalong	 ﾠcan	 ﾠremind	 ﾠus	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠactually	 ﾠtest	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠmind-ﾭ‐reading	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother	 ﾠevery	 ﾠday,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresumption	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
makes	 ﾠus	 ﾠall	 ﾠpretty	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbehave	 ﾠindistinguishably	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠbrains	 ﾠ(2).	 ﾠSo	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
principle,	 ﾠa	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexacting	 ﾠthan	 ﾠT3,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
neurobehavioral	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest,	 ﾠT4:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtotally	 ﾠindistinguishable	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠus	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠverbal	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ(T2)	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠsensorimotor	 ﾠ
performance	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ(T3)	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠneurobehavioral	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠcapacity.	 ﾠ
After	 ﾠall,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠinternally	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠobservable	 ﾠ(especially	 ﾠtoday,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠera	 ﾠof	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠimagery)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠexternally.	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠwould	 ﾠany	 ﾠgood	 ﾠ
empirical	 ﾠscientist	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠignore	 ﾠobservable	 ﾠdata?
We	 ﾠwill	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠT4	 ﾠ	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoment.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ irst,	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠTT	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTT	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠisn’t	 ﾠan	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠde inition	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠmind.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠare	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfer	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTT.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfer?	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTT	 ﾠitself	 ﾠis	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
that’s	 ﾠall.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠelse	 ﾠis	 ﾠthere,	 ﾠbesides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how?
Feeling.	 ﾠWe’re	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠDescartes),	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠonly	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠcan	 ﾠknow,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠand	 ﾠmean	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠby	 ﾠit.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠ
course,	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠreal	 ﾠperson,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ
meaningless;	 ﾠand	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠwe’re	 ﾠawake	 ﾠand	 ﾠacting	 ﾠvoluntarily.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhere	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠexample	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠmeaningful.	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
speaker	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠcan	 ﾠknow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsure.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠtells	 ﾠme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠunderstands	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmeans,	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠhim	 ﾠat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠword	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠright,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
it’s	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse),	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsays	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠheadache.	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ“What	 ﾠelse	 ﾠis	 ﾠthere,	 ﾠbesides	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how?”	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠ
exactly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠextra	 ﾠthing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠbesides	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
headache.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠa	 ﾠheadache	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠheadache,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠfact.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠT3,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠpained	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠon	 ﾠyour	 ﾠface,	 ﾠcradle	 ﾠyour	 ﾠ
head	 ﾠin	 ﾠyour	 ﾠhands,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreact	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠuncharacteristically	 ﾠabrupt	 ﾠway	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠtouched	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠspoken	 ﾠto.	 ﾠThat’s	 ﾠheadache	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how	 ﾠtoo.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuspect	 ﾠyou	 ﾠare	 ﾠfaking	 ﾠit,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
move	 ﾠto	 ﾠT4	 ﾠand	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠscan.	 ﾠ(Let’s	 ﾠpretend	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠimagery	 ﾠis	 ﾠso	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreliably	 ﾠdetect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneural	 ﾠcorrelates	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠheadache.)	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠscan	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
positive,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠI	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠheadache?	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsure	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠ
truths,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠapples	 ﾠfalling	 ﾠdown	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠup,	 ﾠF	 ﾠ=	 ﾠma,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠreal	 ﾠworld	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
there.
But	 ﾠis	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠright	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠnot	 ﾠSearle’s	 ﾠheadache	 ﾠthat’s	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
headache	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠT3	 ﾠrobot,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequally	 ﾠcon ident?	 ﾠCertainly	 ﾠnot	 ﾠvia	 ﾠT2.	 ﾠIs	 ﾠT3	 ﾠ
enough?	 ﾠOr	 ﾠdo	 ﾠI	 ﾠneed	 ﾠT4?	 ﾠWe	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠonly	 ﾠinvoke	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠscans	 ﾠand	 ﾠlie	 ﾠdetectors	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠreal	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlying.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrobot	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
T3-ﾭ‐indistinguishable	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠus.	 ﾠDo	 ﾠI	 ﾠreally	 ﾠneed	 ﾠT4	 ﾠto	 ﾠcon irm	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠheadache	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsays	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠbehaves	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
had	 ﾠno	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuspect	 ﾠwas	 ﾠlying,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠI	 ﾠwouldn’t	 ﾠdream	 ﾠof	 ﾠordering	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
brain	 ﾠscan	 ﾠevery	 ﾠtime	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠheadache?
Never	 ﾠmind	 ﾠheadaches.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠabout	 ﾠmeaning?	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠscan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
meaning,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠone.	 ﾠSuppose,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠ
he	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠsymbols	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠand	 ﾠsending,	 ﾠ
despite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠexhibiting	 ﾠT2	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how,	 ﾠa	 ﾠscanner	 ﾠcould	 ﾠcon irm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
he	 ﾠwas	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠexhibiting	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠcorrelates	 ﾠof	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstanding,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
understanding.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠnow	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠa	 ﾠrobot	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠ–	 ﾠpassed	 ﾠT3	 ﾠand	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠT4.	 ﾠBetter	 ﾠstill,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠthis	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrealistic,	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠhimself,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠone,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
California,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdiscovered,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠparticipating	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ irst	 ﾠ
cognitive	 ﾠneuroscience	 ﾠexperiment,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠT3	 ﾠrobot,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
throughout	 ﾠhis	 ﾠlifetime,	 ﾠas	 ﾠprofessor,	 ﾠrelative,	 ﾠcolleague	 ﾠand	 ﾠfriend.	 ﾠHow	 ﾠcon ident	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠhis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠfailing	 ﾠT4	 ﾠmake	 ﾠus	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠhad	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠanything	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠ
said	 ﾠall	 ﾠhis	 ﾠlife?	 ﾠWould	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbe	 ﾠas	 ﾠcon ident	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠostensibly	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
Searle	 ﾠhad	 ﾠassured	 ﾠus,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠroom,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠanything	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcommunicated	 ﾠin	 ﾠChinese?	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhypothetical	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
plausible	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChinese.	 ﾠ(He	 ﾠhad	 ﾠ
never	 ﾠlearned	 ﾠit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠmanipulating	 ﾠsquiggles	 ﾠand	 ﾠsquoggles.)	 ﾠIs	 ﾠfailing	 ﾠT4	 ﾠ
like	 ﾠthat?
Mind-ﾭReading.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠexample	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠwith	 ﾠour	 ﾠmind-ﾭ‐reading	 ﾠintuitions.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠcould	 ﾠtest	 ﾠthem	 ﾠstill	 ﾠfurther.	 ﾠWould	 ﾠfailing	 ﾠT4	 ﾠmake	 ﾠus	 ﾠcon ident	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSearle	 ﾠcould	 ﾠthen	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdismembered,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠturned	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠmindless	 ﾠ
device,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcomponents	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠby	 ﾠscientists,	 ﾠto	 ﾠreverse-ﾭ‐engineer	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrace	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbuilt	 ﾠhim?	 ﾠHow	 ﾠwould	 ﾠSearle’s	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
friends	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthat?
Perhaps	 ﾠit’s	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfair	 ﾠto	 ﾠforce	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠan	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠor	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠhypothetical	 ﾠexamples,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠno	 ﾠTT-ﾭ‐scale	 ﾠrobots	 ﾠ–	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠT3	 ﾠor	 ﾠT4	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠthey’re	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeven	 ﾠpossible.	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠbiological	 ﾠorganism	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
less	 ﾠlike	 ﾠus	 ﾠin	 ﾠevery	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpass	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTests,	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpass	 ﾠ
one,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpass	 ﾠthem	 ﾠall.
If	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠTuring’s	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
still	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcorrect,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhis	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠmethodology	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠreverse-ﾭ‐
engineer	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuild	 ﾠdevices	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠway	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheart,	 ﾠ
kidneys	 ﾠand	 ﾠlungs	 ﾠ–	 ﾠall	 ﾠbiological	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠfunctions,	 ﾠby	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠ
observation	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanipulation.
The	 ﾠtrouble	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠare	 ﾠour	 ﾠfunctions.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠhearts,	 ﾠ
kidneys	 ﾠand	 ﾠlungs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠis	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠmechanical	 ﾠand	 ﾠchemical	 ﾠ–	 ﾠpump	 ﾠblood	 ﾠor	 ﾠair,	 ﾠ
 ilter	 ﾠ luids,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠon	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbrains	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠTheir	 ﾠ
know-ﾭ‐how	 ﾠis	 ﾠour	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar,	 ﾠcomputation	 ﾠand	 ﾠrobotics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠways	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠderived	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvaguest	 ﾠinklings	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠanything	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠour	 ﾠbrains	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠComputational	 ﾠand	 ﾠrobotic	 ﾠdevices	 ﾠare	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠtoys,	 ﾠ
compared	 ﾠto	 ﾠus;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠa	 ﾠtiny	 ﾠfragment	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠneuroscience	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠa	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠanything	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ(apart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ“vegetative”	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠtemperature	 ﾠregulation,	 ﾠ
balance	 ﾠor	 ﾠbreathing,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheart	 ﾠor	 ﾠkidney	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbrain).
So	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain’s	 ﾠway	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
know-ﾭ‐how,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠsucceeds	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
doing	 ﾠ	 ﾠit	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠbuild	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwork	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠworks,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
test	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbegins	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠTest	 ﾠagain.	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠscience	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
after	 ﾠall	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠexplanation.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠexplanations	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtestable.
Causality	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExplanatory	 ﾠGap.	 ﾠLet	 ﾠme	 ﾠclose	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠre lections	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
causality,	 ﾠby	 ﾠreturning,	 ﾠas	 ﾠpromised,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“mind	 ﾠover	 ﾠmatter.”	 ﾠLet’s	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
confess	 ﾠthat	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformal	 ﾠposition	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠtake	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“mind/body”	 ﾠ
problem,	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠto	 ﾠcognize;	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠpassive.	 ﾠNot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdo	 ﾠmy	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ
something,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠso	 ﾠdo	 ﾠmy	 ﾠmotor	 ﾠexperiences.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠto	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠ
actions,	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠlike	 ﾠit.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠ
causing	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactions	 ﾠby	 ﾠ“willing”	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ(Don’t	 ﾠask	 ﾠme	 ﾠwhat’s	 ﾠcausing	 ﾠmy	 ﾠwilling;	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠ
tempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ“me”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeven	 ﾠDescartes	 ﾠknows	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreally	 ﾠmeans;	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike.)
Now	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreally	 ﾠa	 ﾠdigression	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠfree	 ﾠwill.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠclosing	 ﾠ
re lection	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠin	 ﾠcognition,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠ
cognition	 ﾠcausally.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠundeniable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠ(that’s	 ﾠDescartes’	 ﾠCogito	 ﾠagain).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠessay	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠinescapable	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠT3	 ﾠor	 ﾠT4	 ﾠ
successfully	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠand	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠturns	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠexplanations	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠand	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
capture	 ﾠand	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠfeeling.	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠexplan	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠever	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠand	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ(just	 ﾠas	 ﾠTuring	 ﾠsuggested)	 ﾠthere’s	 ﾠno	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠin	 ﾠasking	 ﾠfor	 ﾠor	 ﾠexpecting	 ﾠ
more.	 ﾠRegardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠwe	 ﾠarrive	 ﾠat	 ﾠour	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠvia	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠT3,	 ﾠT4,	 ﾠor	 ﾠvia	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
direct	 ﾠobservation,	 ﾠmanipulation	 ﾠand	 ﾠmodeling	 ﾠof	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠfunction,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalways	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
faced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠexplained	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition,	 ﾠor	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how.
And	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠpinpoint	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠany	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
that:	 ﾠCausal	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhow	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthings	 ﾠhappen	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠcausally.	 ﾠCausal	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
designing	 ﾠa	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠturns	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuccessfully	 ﾠpass	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠT3,	 ﾠor	 ﾠT4,	 ﾠor	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
modeling	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠgives	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠits	 ﾠT4	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalways	 ﾠbe	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠusual	 ﾠ
sort	 ﾠof	 ﾠskepticism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠto	 ﾠignore	 ﾠas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠworth	 ﾠfretting	 ﾠabout.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠ
perhaps	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠworth	 ﾠfretting	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠday,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠour	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalways	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequally	 ﾠcompatible	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠfeeling.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠunless	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
telekinetic	 ﾠdualists,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠa	 ﾠseparate,	 ﾠunique	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ
(“mind	 ﾠover	 ﾠmatter”	 ﾠ)	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠevidence,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠoverwhelming	 ﾠ
evidence	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠroom	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfeeling.
Yet,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠillusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthings	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠ
like	 ﾠit,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠillusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠlike	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthings	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠI	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠlike	 ﾠit.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠreal	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠtoothache	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠtooth.
So	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠT3	 ﾠor	 ﾠT4	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠreally	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠand	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠ
real	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbrains	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠT3	 ﾠor	 ﾠT4	 ﾠ
know-ﾭ‐how	 ﾠwill	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠhow	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfeel.	 ﾠI	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠmystical,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ“capture”	 ﾠ
feeling.	 ﾠIt’s	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐
how,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠfeelings.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtransparent	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠT2,	 ﾠT3,	 ﾠand	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠT4	 ﾠknow-ﾭ‐how	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDarwinian	 ﾠ
survival	 ﾠmachines	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠall	 ﾠare,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠhow	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ
feelings	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe.	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